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FEDERAL TAX POLICY, TAx SUBSIDIES, AND
THE FINANCING OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
FACILITIES
DANIEL J. LATHROPE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Competition among cities for the elusive prize of a professional
sports franchise has spawned a building boom in stadiums, arenas, and
ballparks. The combination of the monopoly power of major sports
leagues, economic relationships in professional sports, and the de-
mand for professional sports entertainment frequently makes the con-
struction of new, publicly owned sports facilities, with lavish financial
subsidies for its tenant, a condition for a city to acquire or retain a
professional sports team.
Local, state, and federal taxpayers subsidize professional teams
that use a publicly owned sports facility. The state and local subsidy is
typically provided through below-market rents, guarantees, and direct
payments on behalf of the team. The federal subsidy is provided
when state or local bonds are used to finance the facility. Below-mar-
ket interest rates are paid on such bonds because the interest can nor-
mally be received by the bond holders free from any federal tax
liability.1 The savings on interest costs are a subsidy for construction
of the facility.
The economic and social justifications for state and local subsi-
dies of professional sports franchises have been the subject of much
debate and analysis. Research indicates that the economic benefits
realized from a professional sports team do not justify the subsidies.'
The policy justifications for federal tax subsidies of professional sports
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law; LL.M. 1979,
New York University; J.D. 1977, Northwestern University; B.S.B.A. 1973, University of
Denver.
1. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (1997).
2. See Jon Morgan, More Pro Teams Getting New, Rich Leases on Life, Baltimore
Joins Trend in Lucrative Stadium, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 9, 1996, at C1, available in
1996 WL 6608786.
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franchises are even more questionable. This subsidy has recently
drawn congressional attention.3
The federal tax laws on tax-exempt financing also have a perni-
cious effect on cities constructing new sports facilities. Surprisingly,
the tax laws practically require a city to offer rental subsidies to a pro-
fessional team in order to secure the tax exemption for interest paid
on the bonds used to finance the facility. The federal tax laws also
place no limits on the size of the total federal tax subsidy available to
a publicly owned sports facility and its professional team tenant.
This article analyzes the legal and policy issues relating to tax-
exempt financing of professional sports facilities. Section II examines
the recent building boom in those facilities and the forces underlying
that boom. Section III examines the federal tax laws on tax-exempt
financing and the federal subsidy for publicly owned stadiums, arenas,
and ballparks. Finally, Section IV analyzes whether there is any policy
justification for the federal subsidy and examines the possibility of re-
form and potential legislative changes in the tax laws.
II. THE BUILDING BOOM IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FACILITIES
A. Introduction
A building boom in professional sports stadiums, arenas, and
ballparks has been underway since the late 1960s.4 Between 1960 and
1990 a total of sixty new stadiums and arenas were constructed for
professional baseball, basketball, football, and hockey franchises.5 In
comparison, between 1989 and 1996 more than thirty new professional
sports venues were constructed and, at the beginning of 1996, nearly
thirty cities with professional sports franchises were considering the
construction of new facilities.6 In professional basketball and hockey
alone, twenty new arenas have been built since 1990 and an additional
four are under construction or approved.7
3. See Antitrust Issues in Relocation of Professional Sports Franchises: Hearings On
S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights, & Competition of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 113 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Rob-
ert A. Baade).
4. See JAMES QUIRK & RODNEY D. FORT, PAY DIRT, THE BUSINESS OF PROFES-
SIONAL SPORTS 135 tbl. 4.5 (1992).
5. See id.
6. See Morgan, supra note 2, at C1.
7. See John Helyar, Cities Face Off to Join the NHL's Game, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17,
1997, at B9, available in 1997 WL-WSJ 2406165. The building boom also extends beyond
major league sports. As of 1996, forty-nine new minor league baseball facilities have
opened since 1990. See MARTIN J. GREENBERG & JAMES T. GRAY, THE STADIUM GAME 4
(1996).
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Many other municipalities are also considering stadium or arena
projects in the hopes of attracting a major sports franchise.8
The building boom in professional sports facilities is consuming a
significant amount of resources. It has been estimated that new sta-
dium and arena construction costs were approximately $500 million in
the 1960s, $1.5 billion in the 1970s, and $1.5 billion in the 1980s.9 The
cost of sports facilities has increased dramatically, and it is estimated
that more than $5 billion may eventually be expended on new stadi-
ums, arenas, and ballparks in the latter part of the 1990s. 10 The total
cost for the facilities planned during the decade is expected to exceed
$8 billion.'
There are many causes for the explosion in the construction of
new professional sports facilities. The primary cause is the monopoly
power of the major sports leagues.' 2 Because the leagues limit the
supply of existing franchises, a professional sports team has tremen-
dous bargaining power with a city when it seeks construction of a new
facility or negotiates over the rental terms for its occupancy of a pub-
licly owned stadium or arena.' 3 A club can use the threat of moving
and overtures from other cities to enforce take it or leave it demands
for a new stadium or arena with excessively beneficial lease terms.14
The current state of the antitrust laws also provides a professional
team with leverage in its dealings with cities about construction of a
new facility. Since the Ninth Circuit's decision regarding the Oakland
Raiders' move to Los Angeles in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Commission v. National Football League,'5 a professional sports
league is potentially at risk for antitrust claims, including treble dam-
ages, if it denies a franchise permission to relocate to another city.' 6
8. For example, Nashville, Tennessee; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Raleigh-Durham,
North Carolina; Hampton Roads, Virginia; Columbus, Ohio; and Minneapolis-St. Paul,
Minnesota, have either built or are considering building arenas to attract a National
Hockey League franchise. See Helyar, supra note 7, at B9.
9. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 4, at 136.
10. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 113.
11. See John Riley, Where The Grass Is Always... Greener, NEWSDAY, Aug. 18,1996,
at A4.
12. See KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE SPORTS FRANCHISE GAME 1-2 (1995); Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 104-11 (statement of Stephen R. Ross).
13. See Shropshire, supra note 12, at 1-2; Hearings, supra note 3, at 104-11 (statement
of Stephen R. Ross) (discussing monopoly power of NFL teams and possible solutions).
14. See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 12, at 1-2.
15. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
16. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 70 (statement of Paul Tagliabue). Baseball gener-
ally enjoys some form of exemption from the antitrust laws. See Federal Base Ball Club of
Baltimore v. National League of Prof'l Base'Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922); Tool-
son v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282
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For example, the National Football League recently approved the
move of the Los Angeles Rams to St. Louis. Analysts claim that this
decision was motivated, at least in part, by fear of exposure to signifi-
cant antitrust liability. 17 The National Football League, however, re-
ceived a multi-million dollar relocation fee as a condition for granting
approval to the move.18 Thus, there was also a financial incentive for
the league to permit the relocation of the Rams. Regardless of the
motivations for league approval of franchise moves, the artificially low
supply of franchises, combined with the lack of league control over
franchise relocations, makes each club, in effect, a free agent in a mar-
ket where demand for its product is artificially high. That market
power permits a club to enforce its demands for a new facility pro-
vided on financially advantageous terms.
The evolving economic relationships in professional sports are
also a force contributing to the building boom in professional sports
facilities. Teams in the major professional sports leagues share certain
forms of revenue, such as the income from ticket sales and national
television contracts.' 9 Recent collective bargaining agreements be-
tween the clubs' and players' associations have generally assured the
players a designated percentage of defined league revenue under a
"salary cap" arrangement.20 For example, in the National Football
League ("NFL"), the clubs share television revenue equally and split
gate receipts: 60% to the home team and 40% to the visiting team.2'
In 1995, under the collective bargaining agreement, teams had to pay
63% of designated gross revenue for player salaries and benefits.22
These rules are subject to some important qualifications. Stadium rev-
enue, such as income from luxury box seats, advertising, concessions,
and parking, is generally exempt from revenue sharing.23 Further, in
calculating expenditures under the salary cap, signing bonuses are
pro-rated over the life of a player's contract.24 The combination of
(1972). However, two courts have held that baseball's special status under the antitrust
laws extends only to its player reserve system. See Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F.
Supp. 420, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Butterworth v. National League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs,
644 So. 2d 1021, 1025 (Fla. 1994). Thus, baseball's antitrust exposure for a decision to
relocate a franchise is less certain.
17. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 54 (statement of Paul Tagliabue).
18. See id. at 65-66 (exchange between Senator DeWine and Paul Tagliabue).
19. See MARTIN J. GREENBERG, SPORTS LAW PRACTICE § 1.07(10)(c) (Supp. 1996).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. Some additional sharing has begun among the clubs.
24. See Peter King, Down... and Out. (Cleveland Browns relocation), SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, Nov. 13, 1995, at 28, 32, available in 1995 WL 12559615.
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these loopholes provides a powerful incentive for a NFL team to max-
imize stadium revenues in order to be able to pay signing bonuses to
attract highly rated free agents. The importance of stadium revenue is
also clear from the fact that it has grown to as much as 25% of some
teams' revenue stream.
25
The Dallas Cowboys have been the most successful NFL
franchise at this strategy. The Cowboys lead the league in total reve-
nue with $111.2 million.26 Their stadium revenue has increased from
$7 million to $39.8 million in the past six years.27 The Cowboys' sta-
dium revenue has included sales of pieces of original artificial turf
from Texas Stadium and controversial sponsorships with Pepsi, Nike,
and American Express.28 In total, it's estimated that the Cowboys
have earned between $50 million and $75 million in total stadium rev-
enue which does not have to be shared with other clubs under the
revenue sharing arrangement. 29 The Cowboys' stadium revenue ad-
vantage over other NFL teams has given them a significant advantage
in attracting free agents, such as Deion Sanders, with large signing
bonuses. 30
B. State and Local Subsidies for Professional Sports Franchises
Professional sports stadiums and arenas are predominantly pub-
licly owned.31 The lease concessions offered by publicly owned sports
facilities to professional franchises include reduced and deferred lease
payments, as well as income from luxury seating, parking, food and
concession sales, and stadium advertising.32 Cities have also guaran-
teed minimum ticket sales for a franchise, paid a club's financial obli-
gations to its former city, paid league relocation fees, and constructed
new practice facilities in order to attract or retain a professional sports
25. See Jeffrey Meitrodt, Gap Widens Between Haves, Have-Nots: Large-Market
Teams Gaining Competitive Edge With Outside Revenues, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICA-
Yu, , Jan. 24, 1997, at S42, available in 1997 WL 4201422.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. The Cowboys' stadium sponsorships were initially challenged by the
league. A settlement was reached in December, 1996, which allows the Cowboys to keep
those revenues. See id.
30. For example, it is estimated that the Denver Broncos and Detroit Lions receive no
revenue from their stadium arrangements. See Michael K. Ozanian, The High-Stakes
Game of Team Ownership, FIN. WORLD, May 20, 1996, at 53, available in 1996 WL
8506223.
31. As of 1991, 77% of the arenas used by major sports league teams were publicly
owned. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 4, at 127.
32. See id. at 146, 149-51; Morgan, supra note 2, at C1.
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franchise.33 For example, to attract the Rams from Los Angeles, St.
Louis is providing game-day use of a new $260 million stadium for
rent equal to $250,000 per year, 25% of the stadium advertising, and
half of the stadium's game-day operational costs. 34 The team also re-
ceives 75% of the $1.3 million annual payment made by Trans World
Airlines to name the stadium the "Trans World Dome" and be desig-
nated as the official airline of the Rams .3  The bottom line is that the
Rams receive more stadium revenue than their rental obligation. In
addition, St. Louis (1) reimbursed the Rams for lost revenue in south-
ern California; (2) sold $70 million in seat licenses before the move
was final; (3) guaranteed a three-year sellout of sky boxes and luxury
seats and an 85% sellout for the next fifteen years; (4) paid off $28
million in debt to the Rams' Anaheim, California, stadium; (5) paid a
$29 million relocation fee to the National Football League and a $10
million settlement with the league; and (6) built a $12.5 million prac-
tice complex for the Rams.36 Not surprisingly, the Rams arrangement
with St. Louis has been called "the best of all stadium deals ' 37 and the
"mother of all leases. ' 38
The St. Louis arrangement with the Rams, however, is not
unique. When the Cleveland Browns moved to Baltimore, the state of
Maryland built a stadium worth nearly $200 million and included adja-
cent parking for the team. 39 The club will keep all profits, except for
taxes, and reimburse the state $3 million to $4 million per year to op-
erate the stadium.4 ° In addition, the team will act as the stadium's
promoter, booking events in the off-season and receiving a 10% fee
plus one-half of any profits.4 The club has to bear any losses from
this arrangement. 42 The Houston Oilers have moved to Nashville,
Tennessee, for an identical rental agreement.43
The demands by professional sports teams upon cities are also
escalating. Early in 1997, the San Francisco 49ers proposed that the
city of San Francisco support the construction of a $536 million sta-
33. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 4, at 144-55.
34. See Morgan, supra note 2, at C1.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Riley, supra note 11, at A4.
39. See Morgan, supra note 2, at C1.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
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dium and retail-entertainment complex with $100 million in bonds."
The facility would have a 75,000-seat stadium with a 1.4 million
square-foot mall containing stores, restaurants, and a 30-screen movie
theater complex.45 Corporations related to 49er owner Eddie
DeBartolo will jointly develop the project.46 President of the 49ers
Carmen Policy stated that the club needs the new facility to remain
competitive and indicated that the 49ers intend to enforce their de-
mands.47 He was quoted as stating that "[i]f this deal doesn't work...
I can't imagine any owner being able to keep an NFL team in San
Francisco. '"48 San Francisco, however, may be getting a bargain. In
New York City, new facilities for the Yankees, Mets, and Islanders are
being discussed and the total cost for those projects is expected to
exceed $1.5 billion.49
C. Are State and Local Subsidies Economically Justified?
The subsidy provided to a professional sports franchise by a pub-
licly owned stadium or arena is approximately equal to the difference
between the rental charged by the publicly owned facility and what
the club would pay in a competitive market to a private owner operat-
ing the facility to earn a market rate of return on the owner's invest-
ment.50 When measured in this manner, almost all publicly owned
facilities subsidize their sports tenants, sometimes by many millions of
dollars per year.51 In fact, it is estimated that a new stadium or arena
can add between $10 million to $40 million to a team's revenue.52
Current research indicates that state and local subsidies for pro-
fessional sports franchises generally are not economically justified.
There are several reasons for this conclusion. First, despite public per-
ceptions, a professional sports franchise has only a small total eco-
nomic effect, about the same as that of a new department store.
53
Second, the impact studies typically used to support public expendi-
44. See Edward Epstein, 49ers Say They'll Leave If June Vote Fails / Team Sees Sta-
dium Measures Test of S.F's Commitment, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11, 1997, at Al, available in
1997 WL 6691409.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See Riley, supra note 11, at A4.
50. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 4, at 171.
51. See id.
52. See Professional Sports: The Challenges Facing the Future of the Industry, Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 55 (1996) [hereinafter Hearings II]
(statement of Andrew Zimbalist).
53. See id. at 56.
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tures on sports facilities are flawed. Typically, the increased spending
and economic development produced by a new facility is exagger-
ated.54 The impact studies generally assume that increased stadium
revenue represents a corresponding expansion in the local economy;
however, it is more logical to assume that a large portion of such
spending is being shifted from other activities in the city or surround-
ing area." This error is compounded because increased sports-related
spending is also assumed to ripple through the local economy and
multiply the economic effects of that spending.56
The potential flaws in economic analysis of the effects of a new
stadium recently came to light in San Francisco. A budget analyst for
the city concluded that the retail sales at the proposed new facility
would simply be shifted away from other parts of the city so that all of
the sales tax revenue generated by the stadium would not produce a
net gain.57 The budget analyst concluded that the stadium proposal
could cost city taxpayers $4.6 million annually from the general fund
for this reason.58
Experts have even concluded that the construction of a new pub-
licly owned stadium may have a negative economic impact.5 9 Because
most publicly owned facilities do not cover their operating costs and
produce deficits, governmental entities have to cover such costs with
other funds generated by higher taxes.60 The higher tax rates, in turn,
decrease other economic activity. 61 Additionally, research indicates
that professional sports may reduce a city's share of regional income
because the city's investment is directed toward producing labor-in-
tensive, relatively unskilled (low wage), part-time jobs.62 If other cit-
ies in the region promote full-time, non-seasonal, high wage jobs, they
can expect to achieve greater economic growth.63
The jobs created by a new sports facility also come at a very high
cost. In Maryland, the jobs created by the new football stadium are
54. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 118.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 118; QUIRK & FORT, supra note 4, at 172-73; Dennis Zimmerman, Tax-
Exempt Bonds and the Economics of Professional Sports Stadiums (Cong. Res. Service
Rep. 1996), reprinted in TAX NoTEs TODAY, May 30, 1996, available in WL 96 TNT 106-53
at *2 [hereinafter Professional Sports Stadiums].
57. See Epstein, supra note 44, at Al.
58. See id. Not surprisingly, this conclusion was contested.
59. See Hearings II, supra note 52, at 56.
60. See id.
61. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 119.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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expected to cost between $127,000 and $331,000 per job while the
state's economic development program creates a new job at a cost of
$6,250.61 It has also been estimated that a new $1 billion replacement
for Yankee Stadium would cost $521,000 for every job created or
saved, while the state is normally able to create a job at a cost of about
$10,000.65
D. The Benefit of Subsidies to Owners and Players
The owners of a professional team and its players reap the bene-
fits of the revenues produced by a new sports facility. The increased
revenues dramatically increase the value of the team for the owners.
It is estimated that a team's revenues may increase by nearly 40%
when it moves to a new stadium, thereby producing a $30 million to
$50 million increase in the fair market value of the franchise. 66
The players on a team in a new facility also benefit from the new
revenue. Major league baseball players playing for the five franchises
with new stadiums built since 1989 were paid 27% above the average
league salary in 1995.67 At the same facilities, the fans saw the aver-
age ticket price increase by 32%, compared with a major league aver-
age increase of 8% during the 1990S.68 Thus, those fans were paying
above-average price increases at publicly subsidized stadiums, while
the players received above-average salary increases and the value of
the franchise escalated.
III. TAX-EXEMPT FINANCING OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
FACILITIES
A. Internal Revenue Code Provisions
Under section 103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, interest re-
ceived on a state or local bond is not generally subject to federal in-
come tax.69 Originally, the exclusion from the income tax of interest
on state or local bonds was thought to be constitutionally based, but
today it is viewed as a mechanism whereby Congress, for policy rea-
sons, permits states and cities to borrow at interest rates lower than
64. See Riley, supra note 11, at A4.
65. See id.
66. See idt
67. See id.
68. See idt
69. I.R.C. § 103(a) (1997). A "State or local bond" is any obligation of a State or
political subdivision thereof. See I.R.C. § 103(c)(1) (1997).
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those charged on similar taxable obligations. 70 Lenders are willing to
receive a lower rate of return on a state or local obligation because the
interest paid on such an obligation does not bear a federal tax burden.
The exemption from the federal income tax generally does not
extend to the interest on a "private activity bond. '71 A private activ-
ity bond is one used for activities of a private (i.e., nongovernmental)
person. Such a bond involves use by a private person of bond pro-
ceeds or bond-financed property in excess of certain statutorily estab-
lished limits.
There is an important exception to the general rule that interest
received on private activity bonds is taxable. If a private activity bond
is a "qualified bond," then the interest on the bond will be tax-exempt
under section 103(a). 72 To be qualified, a private activity bond must
be issued for certain designated types of projects that Congress has
decided to subsidize regardless of private use. Qualified bonds must
also satisfy a volume cap which limits the total amount of qualified
bonds that a state may issue.73 Notably, while qualified bonds may be
used to finance facilities such as airports, docks, and wharves, such
bonds may not be used to finance sports facilities.7 1 Thus, to be tax-
exempt, bonds used to finance publicly owned sports facilities must
avoid being classified as private activity bonds.
The definition of a private activity bond includes a bond that
meets both a private use test and a private security test.75 The private
use test is satisfied if more than 10% of the proceeds are used for any
private business use.76 Normally, a professional sports team's use of a
stadium, arena, or ballpark will be greater than the 10% limit; there-
70. See 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFrs 15.2.1 (2d ed. 1991).
71. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(1) (1997). The exemption also does not apply to any arbitrage
bond or bond that does not meet the registration requirements of Section 149. See I.R.C.
§§ 103(b)(2)-(3) (1997).
72. Such interest, however, may be taxed under the federal alternative minimum tax.
See I.R.C. §§ 55(a), 57(a)(5)(c)(i) (1997); DANIEL J. LATHROPE, THE ALTERNATIVE MINI-
MUM TAX § 8.04 (1994).
73. See I.R.C. § 141(e)(1)-(2) (1997). A qualified bond must also satisfy various re-
quirements in Section 147. See I.R.C. § 141(e)(3) (1997).
74. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed a prior exception permitting tax-exemption
for interest on bonds to finance sports facilities. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXA-
TION, 100TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 1175
(Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter General Explanation].
75. See I.R.C. § 141(a)(1) (1997).
76. See I.R.C. § 141(b)(1) (1997). "Private business use" is use in a trade or business
carried on by any person other than a governmental unit. I.R.C. § 141(b)(2)(A)(i) (1997).
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fore, the private security test must be avoided in order to finance the
facility with tax-exempt bonds.
The private security test is satisfied if the principal, or the interest
payments, on more than 10% of the bond proceeds is either directly or
indirectly (1) secured by property used for a private business use or
the rents from such property, or (2) going to be derived from pay-
ments for property used for a private business use.7 7 Thus, for bonds
financing a publicly owned sports facility to be tax-exempt, no more
than 10% of the principal or interest payments can be secured by
either the facility or its rents, or be derived from rents. As a result, a
city or state constructing a sports facility must be willing to find some
other revenue source to pay at least 90% of the principal and interest
on the facility's financing. Further, because no more than 10% of the
principal and interest payments may indirectly come from stadium
revenue, the public authority's total stadium revenue may not exceed
the 10% threshold. The bottom line is that avoiding this 10% rule
practically requires a publicly financed stadium to offer favorable
rental terms to the team using the facility.78 However, contributions
by the team for construction costs and payments of operating costs are
permitted under the 10% test.79
The economic arrangements for new publicly owned sports facili-
ties are being closely tailored to the statutory requirements for tax-
exempt financing. The financing terms generally assure that the mu-
nicipality's share of stadium-generated revenue will not exceed 10%
of the debt service on the bond financing. 0 Other revenue sources
are then used to repay the obligations. For example, the stadium pro-
posed in Baltimore to attract the Cleveland Browns is going to be
financed with $86 million of tax-exempt bonds.8 ' Principal and inter-
est on those bonds will be repaid from state lottery funds and the pub-
lic share of stadium-generated revenue will not exceed 10% of the
debt service on $86 million.' A proposed stadium for the Milwaukee
Brewers is to be financed with $160 million of tax-exempt bonds, a $50
million state loan financed with taxable debt, and a $40 million contri-
bution by the Brewers. 3 Principal and interest on the tax-exempt
77. See I.R.C. § 141(b)(2) (1997).
78. See Professional Sports Stadiums, supra note 56, at *8.
79. See Definition of Private Activity Bond, 59 Fed. Reg. 67,658, 67,670 (1994) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed Dec. 30, 1994).
80. See Professional Sports Stadiums, supra note 56, at *8.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at *7.
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bonds will be repaid with a regional 0.1% sales tax. 4 Taxes on tour-
ists, restaurant sales, car rentals, and other items are also potential
sources for funding the municipality's debt obligations.8 5
B. The Federal Subsidy for Professional Sports Franchises
The below-market rent paid by a professional sports franchise for
use of a publicly owned sports facility is a subsidy provided by local,
state, and federal taxpayers. The total one-year subsidy provided to
teams by publicly owned facilities in just 1989 has been estimated at
approximately $500 million.86 The total subsidy naturally increased as
the costs of sports facilities rose.
The federal share of the total subsidy provided by a publicly
owned facility depends on a variety of factors. The most important
factor determining the federal share is the magnitude of the state and
local subsidy provided by the rental agreement.8 7 As the state and
local subsidy decreases, the federal share of the total subsidy corre-
spondingly increases.88
The interest rate differential between long-term taxable bonds
and long-term state and local tax-exempt bonds, and the percentage of
the project that is financed with tax-exempt bonds are also important
factors in determining the federal share of the total subsidy. 89 A 1996
Congressional Research Service report estimated that the present
value of the interest rate savings on a 100% tax-exempt financed, $225
million stadium ranges between 16.8% and 33.6% of the total con-
struction costs (depending on the interest rate advantage for tax-ex-
empt bonds). 9
Determining the federal share of the total subsidy provided by a
publicly owned sports facility varies from facility to facility, so gener-
alizations are difficult to make. A study of twenty-one publicly fi-
nanced stadiums estimated that the total one-year subsidy for 1989
was $170 million.91 Another study of the same facilities estimates that
the federal subsidy in 1989 from those facilities was $24.3 million, or
16.6% of the total subsidy. 2
84. See id.
85. See GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 7, at 342-43.
86. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 4, at 171.
87. See Professional Sports Stadiums, supra note 56, at *13.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at *12.
91. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 4, at 170-71.
92. See Professional Sports Stadiums, supra note 56, at *12-13.
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IV. FEDERAL TAX POLICY, REFORM, AND PROPOSED
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
A. Introduction
Because it is not constitutionally based, the tax exemption for in-
terest on state and local bonds is a federal subsidy which should be
grounded on some federal policy. Since there are no constitutional
restraints, it is perfectly appropriate for Congress to decide not to sub-
sidize an activity that does not advance some federal interest.
The principal economic rationale for the federal tax subsidy to
state and local borrowing is that public capital facilities may be pro-
vided at less than the optimum level because the benefits of those
facilities spill over political boundaries. Since the benefits of the facil-
ity extend beyond the jurisdiction that provides them, taxpayers in
that jurisdiction will not wish to subsidize the nonresidents who re-
ceive the collective public benefits from the facility. For example, in
the case of an environmental project that will provide benefits to a
broad region, each individual jurisdiction in the region may be reluc-
tant to pursue the project because it will calculate that the benefits to
its taxpayers do not justify undertaking the project. In that situation,
it is appropriate for a higher level of government, such as the federal
government, which receives payments from the entire region, to subsi-
dize the project in order to increase the supply of environmental
facilities. 93
The economic rationale for the federal subsidy suggests that tax-
exempt financing of publicly owned sports facilities is justified only if
two conditions are satisfied.94 First, the facility must provide public or
collective benefits.95 Second, some of these public benefits must spill
over political boundaries so that, without a subsidy, the state and local
sector would provide an inadequate supply of those facilities.96 Mea-
sured against those criteria, the case for the federal tax subsidy of pub-
licly owned sports facilities is extremely weak.
Because the state and local economic benefits from a publicly
owned sports facility are generally exaggerated, it is extremely diffi-
cult to justify the federal tax subsidy based on the theory that suffi-
93. See, e.g., Bruce F. Davie & Dennis Zimmerman, Tax-Exempt Bonds After the
South Carolina Decision, 39 TAx NoTEs 1573, 1577-78 (1988); Charles Vehorn & Edward
Nannenhorn, Setting Limits on the Tax-Exempt Bond Market: Where Do We Go From
Here?, 47 TAx NoTEs 1111, 1112 (1990).
94. See Dennis Zimmerman, Is There a Role for State-Local Tax Deductibility?, 26
TAx NoTEs 489, 490-91 (1985).
95. See id. at 491.
96. See id.
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cient public or collective economic benefits are being provided.
Moreover, the economic justifications for the subsidy are even weaker
from a federal perspective than from a state and local one. 7 While
increased spending at a sports facility may produce some local eco-
nomic activity, there will be very little new, net, national economic
activity generated by a publicly owned sports facility. 8 Additional na-
tional economic activity will be produced only by additional foreign
fans attending games, as well as fans willing to spend their savings to
increase their consumption of sports entertainment. 99
One response to the criticism of the public and collective benefits
from sports facilities is to argue that such criticism unfairly singles out
sports facilities for special scrutiny. 100 The argument would go some-
thing like this: The definition of a private activity bond measures pub-
licness by focusing, in part, upon the revenue source used to pay for
the project. If a public issuer of bonds is willing to back the project
with its full faith and credit, the Internal Revenue Service accepts the
local authority's determination of the public nature of the benefits
provided by the facility. That approach takes into account the inter-
ests of the federal government and respects the autonomy of state and
local governments to make decisions about public finance. The con-
cluding point of the argument would be that singling out certain facili-
ties, such as sports facilities, for adverse treatment, improperly limits
the discretion of local governments concerning the public capital
goods they supply. In short, the argument is that if a local government
decides it wants to use its general credit to build a sports stadium
rather than an environmental project, the federal government should
not interfere with that decision.
This counterargument would have substantial force if it were not
for the monopoly power of the major professional sports leagues. A
city's decision to build a professional sports facility typically is the
product of coercion. The city is faced with threats by the team to
move if its demands for a new facility are not met. At the same time,
the city has no alternative source for a replacement team because
there is no competing league and the existing league has restricted the
availability of expansion franchises.
97. See Professional Sports Stadiums, supra note 56, at *18.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. This argument has been made about a bill introduced by Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan which would eliminate tax-exempt bonds for sports facilities. See State and Lo-
cal Groups Write Moynihan to Protest Stadium Bond Bill, 74 TAX NoTEs 1305, 1305 (1997)
[hereinafter Protest].
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When it demands a new facility, a professional sports team is also
employing its leagues' monopoly power to unlock the federal treasury.
In view of the disparity in bargaining power between the team and a
city, the city's decision to publicly finance a subsidized professional
sports facility provides little or no evidence of the public or collective
benefits that will flow from the facility. Instead, the limited amount of
measurable local and national economic benefits from the facility
should lead to the denial of the federal subsidy.
The monopoly power of major professional sports leagues also
should tend to produce an oversupply of publicly financed sports facil-
ities, thereby negating the second factor necessary to justify a federal
tax subsidy. Again, the superior bargaining power of teams in dealing
with cities will produce more facilities than would be constructed in a
competitive market. Moreover, because the federal tax subsidy
reduces the state and local costs of constructing a sports facility, the
subsidy will further aggravate the imbalance between the supply and
demand of facilities.
Serious equity issues are also raised by the federal subsidy for
publicly owned sports facilities. The subsidy is provided by all taxpay-
ers and ultimately benefits the financially well-off owners and players
in professional sports. From an equity perspective, the subsidy is an
example of an open-ended corporate welfare program supported by
all taxpayers, including those with no access to professional sports
entertainment.
In the case of a franchise relocation, additional federal tax policy
and equity issues are raised. 1° 1 Is there a tax policy that justifies a
federal subsidy to move the Cleveland Browns to Baltimore, Mary-
land, or to move the Los Angeles Rams to St. Louis, Missouri?
Should taxpayers in North Dakota or New Mexico be required to pro-
vide financial assistance to the Houston Oilers to help them move to
Nashville, Tennessee? There is no policy justification that supports an
answer of "yes" to either of those questions.
If the federal tax subsidy to professional sports facilities is not
justified on either policy or equity grounds, the subsidy should be re-
duced or eliminated. The next section examines possible reforms and
proposed legislative solutions.
101. See generally Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports
Franchise Relocations From Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing Market-
place Competition, League Autonomy, and the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L.
REv. 57 (1997) (examining franchise relocation issues).
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
B. Reform and Possible Legislative Solutions
The federal tax subsidy for professional sports facilities is begin-
ning to receive greater congressional attention. Because the subsidy is
not justified on either policy or equity grounds, it should be either
repealed or limited. In fact, it is likely that Congress thought the sub-
sidy was effectively ended when it reorganized and amended the tax
rules governing tax-exempt financing in the Tax Reform Act of
1986.102 At the time, one of Congress' concerns was the dramatic in-
crease in long-term, tax-exempt financing of private activities. Be-
tween 1975 and 1985, the volume of such obligations increased from
$8.9 billion to $116.4 billion; tax-exempt financing for private activities
increased from 29% to 53% as a share of total state and local govern-
ment borrowings. 103 To address that concern, the Tax Reform Act of
1986 repealed certain categories of private activity bonds that could
qualify as tax-exempt and placed a limitation on the total volume of
tax-exempt bonds that can be issued for activities of nongovernmental
persons.1 4 One important change was to eliminate sports facilities
from the category of facilities that could be financed on a tax-exempt
basis with private activity bonds. 0 5 However, that change probably
did not indicate a broader congressional intent to eliminate all tax-
exempt financing for such facilities. 10 6 More likely, Congress assumed
that tax-exempt financing of sports facilities would end because state
and local taxpayers would not support such projects with other gov-
ernmental revenues.0 7
New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan recently initiated a
legislative effort to eliminate tax-exempt financing for professional
sports facilities.' 0 8 Senator Moynihan's bill would achieve that result
by labeling any bond as a private activity bond if the amount of the
bond proceeds used for professional sports facilities exceeds the
smaller of 5% of the proceeds or $5 million.10 9 "Professional sports
102. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1301(b), 100 Stat. 2603 (1986)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
103. See General Explanation, supra note 74, at 1151.
104. See id. at 1153, 1175.
105. See id. at 1175.
106. The House version of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 would have eliminated the
security interest test from the definition of private activity bonds, which would have made
the use test the only standard. See H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 558 (1985). If that legislation
had passed, stadium bonds could not have been issued on a tax-exempt basis.
107. See Professional Sports Stadiums, supra note 56, at *19.
108. See S. 434, 105th Cong. (1997). Senator Moynihan introduced a similar bill in the
104th Congress. See S. 1880, 104th Cong. (1996).
109. See S. 434, 105th Cong. (1997).
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facilities" generally are defined in the bill as real property and im-
provements used for sports exhibitions, games, or training."' Also,
any use of a facility that generates a monetary benefit for a person
who uses the facility for sports exhibitions, games, or training is con-
sidered a use for professional sports."'
Senator Moynihan has been frank in explaining his motivation for
proposing the repeal of the federal tax subsidy for sports facilities." 2
According to the Senator, tax-exempt financing for stadiums "pro-
vides an unintended federal subsidy and contributes to the enrichment
of persons who need no federal assistance whatsoever.""' 3 It is rea-
sonable to guess that Senator Moynihan's legislative efforts may also
be motivated by the stadium demands on New York City and the
State of New York currently being made by the Yankees, Mets, and
Islanders. Not surprisingly, representatives of the bond industry have
announced their opposition to Senator Moynihan's bill." 4
A middle ground approach to the problem of tax-exempt financ-
ing of sports facilities would be to reclassify them as qualified, or tax-
exempt, private activity bonds. This approach would have several
benefits over the current state of the law. First, the volume cap on
such bonds would force bonds issued for sports facilities to compete
with other forms of financing subject to the cap. The volume cap also
has the effect of limiting the total amount of the federal subsidy to
capped bonds so there would no longer be an open-ended subsidy for
professional sports facilities. The total state and local subsidy to pro-
fessional sports franchises might also be reduced because the bond
issuer's stadium-related revenue could exceed 10% of the principal
and interest on the bonds."' Classifying bonds financing sports facili-
ties as private activity bonds would also subject those bonds to a
number of other Internal Revenue Code provisions. 1 6 Most impor-
tantly, section 147(e) of the Code provides that no part of a qualified
private activity bond may be used to provide a "skybox or other lux-
110. Id. § 2(a).
111. The bill directs the Treasury to sort out by regulation the use of related facilities,
maltase complexes, and other situations. See id. § 3(a).
112. See Tax Exempt Bonds, Industry Officials Fear Precedent Set By Moynihan Bill to
Ban Bonds for Stadiums, BNA Daily Tax Report, June 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, 1996
DTR d7, at *3.
113. Id.
114. See Protest, supra note 100, at 1305-06.
115. See Professional Sports Stadiums, supra note 56, at *20.
116. See id. at *21.
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ury box."' 1 7 Thus, the federal subsidy for those expenditures would
end completely.
A third legislative approach to the federal subsidy for profes-
sional sports facilities has been offered by Ohio Senators DeWine and
Glenn. 118 In the 104th Congress, they introduced a bill that would
restrict the federal tax subsidy for certain relocating NFL
franchises. 119 In general, the bill would deny the federal subsidy if a
relocating NFL franchise breaks an existing lease with a publicly
owned facility. 2 ' Specifically, the bill would apply if (1) the team is
currently in a publicly owned facility and its lease has not expired; (2)
it is going to relocate to a publicly owned facility; (3) in the preceding
season it averaged attendance of at least 75 % of stadium capacity; and
(4) its current jurisdiction has voted taxes to improve the existing fa-
cility or build a new facility. 12  If those requirements are satisfied, a
relocating franchise cannot receive the benefits of tax-exempt
financing. 122
The DeWine-Glenn approach might be effective in restricting or
limiting relocations of NFL franchises, but it is defective from a fed-
eral tax perspective. Instead of getting the federal government out of
the business of subsidizing NFL franchises, this approach retains the
full subsidy and simply allocates it as a bargaining chip between cities
competing for a team.
It is possible, however, that the total federal subsidy for profes-
sional sports facilities would be reduced under the DeWine-Glenn ap-
proach because without the subsidy, fewer cities will compete for
teams. Less competition for franchises will likely reduce the cost to a
city to retain a team and reduce the federal subsidy. It is also possible
that some cities might attempt to attract an NFL team without the
federal subsidy. To the extent those cities are successful, the total fed-
eral subsidy for sports facilities would also be reduced.
V. CONCLUSION
The building boom in professional sports facilities is an all-out
raid by professional sports teams on the resources of cities, states, and
the federal government. That raid is driven by the monopoly power
117. Id. at *22.
118. See To Provide for the Federal Treatment of Certain Relocating National Football
League Franchises, and for Other Purposes, S. 1529, 104th Cong. (1996).
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
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of the major sports leagues and the restriction the leagues place on the
number of existing franchises. So long as that monopoly continues,
state and local governments will be called upon to provide subsidies to
attract or retain a professional sports franchise.
The present situation has been described as a welfare system
which transfers hundreds of millions of dollars to the owners and play-
ers in the major sports leagues. The federal government should termi-
nate the subsidy it provides to professional teams and players through
tax-exempt financing of stadiums, arenas, and ballparks. The subsidy
is achieved by teams through coercive bargaining with cities and is
both inequitable and not economically justified. Congress needs to
act to advance sound tax policy.
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